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DUIs AND APPLE PIE: A SURVEY OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE IN DUI PROSECUTIONS
Cheyenne L. Palmer*
INTRODUCTION

Uncompromising enforcement of laws designed to rid our highways of the
scourge of the drunk driver ranks only slightly behind the veneration of
motherhood and probably slightly ahead of a robust hankering1 after apple
pie in the hierarchy of values firmly embedded in our culture.
Justice Robert L. Clifford of the New Jersey Supreme Court made the above
point as the sole dissenter in a case involving prosecutions of driving under the
influence (hereinafter DUI) in New Jersey. This Article will explore the effect of
the phenomenon described by Justice Clifford on DUI statutes and court decisions across the country. The "uncompromising enforcement" of DUI laws has
lead to the continuing erosion of drivers' ability to defend themselves against
DUI charges.
A survey of the case law across the United States shows uniformity in the
trend of prosecuting DUIs to the exclusion of the rights of the accused. States are
repeatedly creating laws, upheld by the courts, which curb a driver's right to be
presumed innocent, to cross-examine the evidence presented against him, and his
right to a trial by jury. Many states have addressed the issues, which will be discussed in this article; 2 however, to narrow the scope of the discussion, this Article
will focus primarily on Minnesota and New Jersey. These states have the most
J.D., University of Iowa College of Law; B.A., Iowa State University. Ms. Palmer is currently
an Associate Attorney at the firm of Epstein & Robbins, in Jacksonville, Florida, where she focuses
primarily on DUI defense. From 2001-2008, she was an Assistant State Attorney prosecuting all
crimes, including DUI's. The Author would like to make the following brief acknowledgements. To
David: Thank you for rescuing me from my previous professional life. To my parents and family:
Thank you for making me who I am. To my friends who are too many to name and more than I
deserve: Thank you for keeping me who I am. To Jules, Beep and Lori: Thank you for all of the above
and so much more than I could ever say in a footnote.
1 State v. Tischio, 527 A.2d 388, 397 (N.J. 1987) (J. Clifford, dissenting).
2 See Fargo v. Levine, 747 N.W.2d 130 (N.D. 2008); Commonwealth v. House, No. 2008-SC000114-DG, 2009 WL 2705919 (Ky. Aug. 27,2009); People v. Robinson, 860 N.Y.S.2d 159 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2008); People v. Cialino, 831 N.Y.S. 2d 680 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 2007); People v. Hampe, 581 N.Y.S.
2d 861 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Hills v. State, 663 S.E.2d 265 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); Cottrell v. State, 651
S.E.2d 444 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007); Holowiak v. State, 672 S.E.2d 454 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009); Mathis v.
State, 681 S.E.2d 179 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Walters, No. DBDMV050340997S, 2006 WL
785393 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2006); State v. Burnell, 2007 WL 241230, 2007 WL 241230 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 2007); State v. Kuhl, 755 N.W.2d 389 (Neb. 2008); State v. Bernini, 207 P.3d 789
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Cruz, No. 1 CA-CR 08-0296, 2009 WL 551119 (Ariz. Ct. App. Mar. 5,
2009); Pflieger v. State, 952 So.2d 1251 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Moe v. State, 944 So.2d 1096 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2006); and State v. Bastos, 985 So.2d 37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
*
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extensive body of law on the subject of this article; the issues raised in this Article
have been addressed by the Supreme Courts of these states; and the states are
representative of the spectrum from the most lenient (Minnesota) to most stringent (New Jersey) DUI laws.
The Article will lay out the pertinent rights of the accused associated with
criminal prosecution and will address the specific statutory schemes of New
Jersey and Minnesota. Because DUI laws require drivers to submit to scientific
3
testing in order to determine their alleged impairment due to alcohol, a discussion regarding the machines used in the scientific testing is included. Also addressed are drivers' attempts to challenge the validity of this scientific testing.
Concentrating on the challenges to the scientific reliability of the breath testing
machines illustrates that the law across the United States is evolving in such a
way that drivers are precluded from defending themselves in any real sense from
a DUI prosecution. Finally, the article concludes with an alternate idea as to how
the "scourge of drink driving" may be addressed.

I.

ANALYSIS

OF RIGHTS

There are three specific rights of the accused which are vitiated by the current
state of DUI laws across the country: a person is innocent until proven guilty; a
person has a right to confront the evidence presented against him; and an accused
has a right to a trial by jury. Below, each right will be addressed as to its origin
and meaning in the general prosecution of criminals.
A.

Innocent Until Proven Guilty

The words "innocent until proven guilty" do not actually appear in the U.S.
Constitution. However, the concept is a building block of the foundation of our
legal system, and consequently, our jurisprudence. As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Byron White noted, "Itihe principle that there is a presumption of innocence
in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its
4
enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law."
5
In Coffin v. United States, the Defendant was charged with multiple offenses
in a fifty (50) count indictment and the case was tried by a jury. After the trial,
the judge instructed the jury on the charges. The judge charged the jury at length
on the issue of the burden of proof, but neglected to charge the jury on the presumption of innocence. The U.S. Supreme Court heard the case in order to decide whether the judge erred in omitting the presumption of innocence from his
instruction to the jury. In essence, the Court was asked to determine whether the
3
article
4
5

Although the statutes addressed in this article also encompass impairment due to drugs, this
will focus solely on the portions of the statutes pertaining to alcohol.
Coffin v. United States, 15 S. Ct. 394, 403 (1895).
Id.
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presumption of innocence is equivalent to the burden of proof, which in turn,
required the Court to engage in an in-depth analysis of the presumption of innocence. The Court defined the right as follows:
[n]ow, the presumption of innocence is a conclusion drawn by the law in
favor of the citizen, by virtue whereof, when brought to trial upon a criminal charge, he must be acquitted, unless he is proven to be guilty. In other
words, this presumption is an instrument of proof created by the law in
favor of one accused, whereby his innocence is established until sufficient
evidence is introduced to overcome the proof which the law has created.6
The Court went so far as to characterize the presumption of innocence as actual evidence on behalf of the accused. 7 The Court then contrasted the presumption of innocence with the burden of proof. In so doing, the Court noted the
burden of proof:
[i]s the result of the proof, not the proof itself, whereas the presumption of
innocence is one of the instruments of proof, going to bring about the proof
from which reasonable doubt arises; thus one is a cause, the other an effect.
To say that the one is the equivalent of the other is therefore to say that
legal evidence can be excluded from the jury, and that such exclusion may
be cured by instructing them correctly in regard to the method by which
they are required to reach their conclusion upon the proof actually before
them; in other words, that the exclusion of an important element of proof
can be justified by correctly instructing as to the proof admitted. The evolution of the principle of the presumption of innocence, and its resultant, the
doctrine of reasonable doubt, make more apparent the correctness of these
views, and indicate the necessity of enforcing the one in order that the other
may continue to exist. 8
The Court's ruling makes it abundantly clear that the presumption of innocence
is a fundamental right of the accused. Further, the doctrine of reasonable doubt
cannot exist independent of the presumption of innocence.
B.

Right of Confrontation

The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...to be confronted with the witnesses
against him . . . . 9 Relatively recently, the U.S. Supreme Court undertook a
lengthy and substantive review of the Confrontation Clause and its origins.1 ° The
6 Id. at 404-05.
7
8

Id. at 405.
Id.

9

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

10 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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Court found that although the right was codified in the Constitution, its roots far
pre-date the Sixth Amendment and can be found in Roman times.11 However,
the Court opined that the founders based the Sixth Amendment on English common law principles) 2 The meaning and scope of the Confrontation Clause was
clarified through early judicial decisions in various states. One such decision by
the North Carolina Superior Court makes clear that although the Confrontation
Clause specifically delineates "witnesses," the spirit of the Clause encompasses
evidence in general. In discussing the right of confrontation, the Court noted, "it
is a rule of common law, founded on natural justice, that no man shall be
""
prejudiced by evidence which he had not the liberty to cross-examine ....
In its analysis, the U.S. Supreme Court came to the conclusion that, given the
history of the Confrontation Clause, there were two key issues relating to its applicability.' 4 First, the Court considered the argument that the Clause only applies to in-court testimony. The Court rejected this view because, in its
estimation, the impetus behind the right was an effort to preclude the use of "ex
parte examinations" against the accused. 15 The Court went on to address the
meaning of "testimony" within the context of the Clause. The Court began with
the dictionary definition of testimony which is, "[a] solemn declaration or affir16
mation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some fact.",
Based on this definition the Court found the Confrontation Clause applicable
to a very specific type of out of court statement that it christened a "testimonial
statement. ' 17 The Court gave several examples of testimonial statements such as
ex parte in-court testimony, materials such as affidavits, prior testimony that the
Defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements contained
in formalized testimonial materials such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions and statements taken by police officers in the course of
18
investigations.
Second, the Court concluded the Framers would not have allowed testimonial

statements introduced into evidence by a witness not called at trial unless the
witness was unavailable for trial and the Defendant had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine the evidence.' 9 The Court found the Framers did not intend any
exceptions to a Defendant's right to cross examine the witnesses against him.2 °
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

Id. at 42.
Id.
State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103 (Super. Ct. L. & Eq. 1794) (emphasis added).
Washington, 541 U.S. at 50.
Id.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id. at 52-53.
Washington, 541 U.S. at 54.
Id.
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Consequently, the right to cross-examine is a necessary precursor to the admissibility of evidence against an accused under the Constitution.
C.

Right to a Jury Trial

The accused has a right to a trial by jury deriving from two locations in the
federal Constitution. First, the Constitution states, "[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury ...."21 Second, the Bill of Rights
provides, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed ....
The constitutional language does not create any distinction between crimes,
wherein some require a trial by jury and some do not. 23 However, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled otherwise in several different opinions. In early decisions,
the Court found the right to a jury did not extend to every crime.24 At the time
the Constitution was adopted there were offenses, dubbed "petty," which were
tried without juries by justices of the peace in England or corresponding judicial
officers in the Colonies. 25 The Court reasoned that the existence of this phenomenon made it clear the Framers did not intend all crimes to be tried by juries. As
a result the Court was left to determine what constituted a "petty" crime.
Initially, the Court faced the question of whether an individual charged with
an offense punishable by a fine of not more than $300 or imprisonment of not
more than ninety (90) days was entitled to a jury trial. The Court seemed to
struggle with the question when it noted, "[t]he court below thought, as we do,
that the question is not free from doubt...
The Court looked to the crimes
which did not require a jury at the time of the adoption of the Constitution to
make its decision.2 7 Because there were at least sixteen (16) crimes punishable by
three (3) months or more in jail and at least eight (8) crimes punishable by six (6)
months in jail which did not require trial by jury, the Court ruled crimes punishable by ninety (90) days in jail similarly did not entitle a defendant to a trial by
jury. 28 However, in its ruling, the Court did not create a test for what specifically
determined if a crime was "petty" and thereby did not entitle the accused to a
jury trial.
21
22

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl.3.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.

23
24
25
26
27
28

Baldwin v. State, 399 U.S. 66, 74-5 (1970) (Black, J., concurring).
District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624-25 (1937).
Id. at 624.
Id. at 625.
Id.
Id. at 626-27.
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The Court further clarified the right in Baldwin v. State.2 9 In that case the
accused was charged with a crime punishable by up to one (1) year in jail. He was
denied a jury trial. The Court held the accused was in fact entitled to a jury
trial.3" In reaching its decision that the possibility of incarceration for one (1)
year constituted a "serious" offense as opposed to a "petty" offense, the court
laid out the factors to be considered when it noted, "[i]n deciding whether an
offense is 'petty', [sic] we have sought objective criteria reflecting the seriousness
with which society regards the offense, and we have found the most relevant such
criteria is [sic] the severity of the maximum authorized penalty."'3 1 Later in the
opinion the Court added, "[a] better guide 'in determining whether the length of
the authorized prison term of the seriousness of the other punishment is enough
in itself to require a jury trial' is disclosed by the 'existing laws and practices or
the Nation.'" 32 The Court did not create a bright line test, but the above language offers guidelines as to how the right should be evaluated. The key to a jury
trial is demonstrative evidence that legislatures and the mores of the nation indicate the crime is serious. If it is serious by this standard the accused is entitled to
a jury trial.
II.

THE STATUTORY LAW

Although not entirely the same, both Minnesota and New Jersey's DUI statutes are based on the notion of "implied consent." These statutes are representative of DUI law across the United States. Generally, implied consent means that
by undertaking the act of driving in a particular state, a driver implicitly consents
to certain stipulations associated with the act. Specific to the matter at hand, is
that the driver agrees to submit to chemical testing of his breath and/or blood
alcohol content upon the request of a law enforcement officer who has probable
cause to believe the driver is operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.
A.

Minnesota

In pertinent part, Minnesota's implied consent statute specifically states the
following:
(a) Any person who drives, operates, or is in physical control of a motor
vehicle within this state or any boundary water of this state consents.., to a
chemical test of that person's blood breath, or urine for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol . . .. The test must be administered at the
direction of a peace officer.
29
30
31
32

Baldwin, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
Id. at 73-4.
Id. at 68-9.
Id. at 70 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968)).
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(b) The test may be required of a person when an officer has probable cause
to believe the person was driving, operating, or in physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of section 169A.20 (driving while impaired), and one
of the following conditions exist .... ,
The statute then goes on to define four (4) instances, in association with probable
cause, which authorize the test: if the driver is lawfully under arrest for DUI, the
driver has been involved in an accident, the person refuses to submit to preliminary screening, 35,36 or the preliminary screening indicates the driver has an alcohol concentration of .08 or more.37
In Minnesota,
it is a crime for any person to drive, operate, or be in physical control of any
motor vehicle, as defined in section 169A.03, subdivision 15, except for motorboats in operation and off-road recreational vehicles, within this state or
on any boundary water of this state when: (5) the person's alcohol concentration at the time, or as measured within two hours of the time, driving,
operation, or being in physical control of the motor vehicle is 0.08 or more
1138

According to Minnesota statute, evidence that the results of the breath test were

0.04 or more is "relevant evidence" in indicating whether or not a person was

under the influence of alcohol.39
Minnesota does not have a minimum mandatory sentence for a first time offender provided there are no "aggravating factors present." 40 A first time offender without aggravation is guilty of a fourth (4th) degree misdemeanor.41
However if aggravating factors, including prior offenses, are implicated in the
33

MINN. STAT. § 169A.51 (2009).

34 This article will focus only on breath testing and will not address blood or urine testing.
35 Section 169A.51 subdivs. 1(b)(1)-(3).
36 An officer with probable cause to believe an individual is driving while impaired by alcohol
may require the driver to provide a breath test sample for "preliminary screening" using a device
approved for that purpose. Section 169A.41. The results must be used for the purpose of deciding
whether or not to arrest the driver, but may only be used in a court in limited circumstances. Id.
37 Section 169A.51 subdiv. 1(b)(4). Although not germane to the topic at hand, the statute also
requires a driver to submit to testing if the officer has probable cause to believe the driver is operating
a commercial vehicle with the presence of any alcohol. Section 169A.51. Additionally, Minnesota
treats a refusal to take the test as a separate crime punishable by the same sanctions as one found
guilty of taking the test and blowing over a 0.08. Id.
38 Section 169A.20.
39 Section 169A.45 subdiv. 2.
40 The aggravating factors include a prior impaired driving incident within ten (10) years immediately preceding the current offense, having an alcohol concentration of 0.20 or more within two (2)
hours of the event or having a child under the age of sixteen (16) in the vehicle at the time of the
offense if the child is more than thirty-six (36) months younger than the driver. Section 169A.03.
41 Section 169A.27 subdiv. 2.
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crime there are minimum mandatory sanctions required by the law. For purposes
of this article, only first time offenders without aggravating factors will be
considered.
B.

New Jersey

In contrast to Minnesota's law, New Jersey's is much more narrow and strict.
Where Minnesota law necessitates probable cause that a person is driving while
under the influence of alcohol in conjunction with other factors, New Jersey's
implied consent statute only requires probable cause. New Jersey's statute states
only that:
[a]ny person who operates a motor vehicle on any public road, street or
highway or quasi-public area in this State shall be deemed to have given
consent to the taking of samples of his breath for the purpose of making
chemical tests to determine the content of alcohol in his blood; provided,
however, that the taking of samples is made in accordance with the provision of this act and at the request of a police officer who has reasonable
grounds to believe that such person has been operating a motor vehicle in
violation of the provisions of R.S. 39:4-50 ....
The statute specifically provides that no chemical test may be forcibly taken from
an individual.4 3 However, anyone who refuses to submit to such chemical testing
is subject to an additional charge for refusal to submit to a chemical test and
harsher sanctions. 4
New Jersey's definition of DUI is equally as simple. The statute states, "[a]
person who operates a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor . . . or operates a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration of

0.08% or more by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood . " is guilty of
DUI.4 5 Unlike Minnesota, New Jersey does have minimum mandatory sanctions
for a first time offender.4 6 If a first time offender pleads guilty, or is found guilty
of a violation of the statute he must pay a fine between two hundred fifty dollars
($250) and four hundred dollars ($400), be detained between twelve (12) and
forty-eight (48) hours on two consecutive days of not less than six (6) hours as
prescribed by the program requirements of the Intoxicated Driver Resource
42 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50.2(a) (West 2004).
43 Section 39:4-50.2(e).
44 Section 39:4-50.4(a).
45 Section 39:4-50(a).
46 New Jersey also provides harsher sanctions for repeat offenders. Section 39:4-50(2)-(3). But
as noted in the Minnesota section, this Article will only address first time offenders without enhanced
penalties.
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Center, serve a term of imprisonment up to thirty (30) days and forfeit his right to
drive for three (3) months.47
IH.

THE MACHINES

Minnesota and New Jersey use different breath testing machines. Minnesota
uses the Intoxilyzer 5000EN manufactured by CMI, Inc.48 New Jersey uses the
Alcotest 7110 MKIII-C manufactured by Draeger Safety Diagnostics, Inc. 4 9 The
specific science utilized by each machine will be addressed below, however both
machines are operated based on a "source code.",50 A "source code" is a "human
friendly" version of a program. 51 It is what is actually typed into a computer by
the programmer. 52 The source code contains the commands for sequencing the
operation of the machine, data entry questions, operational parameters and
mathematical formulas necessary for breath testing. 53 Put another way, the
source code is the computer instructions followed by the computing device in
processing information.5 4
A.

Intoxilyzer 5000EN

The Intoxilyzer 5000EN is an infrared spectrometry breath alcohol machine.55
The premise of the technology is that all matter will absorb electromagnetic radiation in a unique and consistent manner. 56 No two substances have the same
molecular structure so the science indicates it is possible to analyze and detect a
substance's presence due to the manner in which the matter absorbs wavelengths
of the infrared spectrum.5 7 When infrared light of a particular frequency passing
through a chamber with no alcohol present strikes a detector it creates a particular level of voltage. 58 As the alcohol level in the chamber increases the amount of
light able to pass through the chamber and strike the detector decreases. 59 The
difference between the amount of light passing through the chamber with no alcohol and the amount of light passing through the chamber with alcohol repre47 Section 39:4-50(a)(1).
48 State v. Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d 677 (Minn. 2009).
49 State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114 (N.J. 2008).
50 Id.; Underdahl,767 N.W.2d. at 677.
51 People v. Saghari, No. H021710, 2002 WL 66139, at *2 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2002). See
also State v. Garberg, No. A09-914, 2010 WL 772622 (Minn. App. 2010) (discussing source codes in
the context of a DUI proceeding).
52 Saghari, 2002 WL 66139, at *2 n.2.
53 Levine, 747 N.W.2d at 132.
54 Robinson, 860 N.Y.S. 2d at 167.
55 CMI Online, http://alcoholtest.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).

56 Id.
57

Id.

58 Id.
59 Id.
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sents the concentration of alcohol in the breath sample. 6° The machine then
61
displays the result achieved by this process.
B.

Alcotest 7110 MKIII-C

The Alcotest is a dual sensoric measuring system. 62 It utilizes both infrared
spectroscopy and electrochemical cell technology. 6 3 The machine purports to
measure the concentration of alcohol in a person's blood through breath testing. 64 The machine uses both infrared technology and electric chemical oxidation
in a fuel cell to measure breath alcohol concentration. 65 Consequently, the machine actually produces two results for each breath sample.66
When a breath sample is provided, the infrared chamber captures the breath
sample and uses infrared energy to calculate absorption of the energy by the
alcohol concentrated in the chamber.6 7 The electric chemical fuel cell technology
uses a catalyst to absorb alcohol and provide a second measurement. 68 In the
electric chemical chamber voltage is applied to a small sample to cause a catalytic
reaction which causes the alcohol to oxidize. 69 The oxidation process creates electricity which is measured to determine the amount of alcohol interacting with the
fuel cell. 70 The Alcotest then reports the infrared technology and electric chemical readings on a printout from the machine.7 1 If the results are within acceptable
tolerance 72 the printout shows each of the readings to three decimal places.7 3 The
printout then reports the final breath alcohol result that will be the lowest of the
60 CMI Online, http://alcoholtest.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
61 Id.
62 Draeger, http:/lwww.draeger.comlUS/enUSI (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
63 Id.
64 Chun, 943 A.2d at 128.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Chun, 943 A.2d at 128.
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 An acceptable tolerance is defined by both control tests and the actual breath sample taken
from the driver. Prior to a breath sample the machine tests a solution with a known alcohol concentration of 0.10. To be within tolerance, the results must be between 0.095 and 0.105. If the control test
is within tolerance the machine then prompts the operator for a breath sample. To be valid, the breath
sample must meet four (4) criteria. It must have a minimum volume of 1.5 liters, minimum blowing
time of 4.5 seconds, minimum flow rate of 2.5 liters per minute and the infrared measurement must
not differ by more than one percent in .25 seconds. Once provided, the sample is tested and then the
machine purges the sample. After a two-minute period, the machine prompts the operator for a second sample. The sample results must be within 0.01 of each other or they are not within tolerance. If
the samples are not within tolerance, a third sample will be requested by the machine. See id. at 130,
140.
73 Id.
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readings truncated7 4 to two (2) decimal places.75 Finally, the machine uses a conversion rate to change the breath alcohol result to a blood alcohol result.7 6
IV.

CHALLENGES TO THE MACHINES

The reliability of breath testing machines has been challenged in many different ways across the United States. For example, the reliability of breath test results has been challenged on the basis of insufficient inspection and maintenance
of the machine itself 7 7and improper observation of the test subject prior to the
breath test sample being taken.78
Currently, one of the most prevalent challenges is in regards to the source
code. Across the country, defendants are attempting to discover the source code
to the particular machine used in their case so as to have the opportunity to
independently review the source code. The defendants' reasoning in seeking to
uncover errors in the code is that such errors would adversely affect the reliability
of the breath test results used in their prosecution. The majority of states that
have addressed the issue have not reached the science behind the source code.
Instead, they have summarily dismissed the issue on procedural grounds. Specifically, multiple states have found the prosecution is not required to produce the
source code to defendants because the source code is not within the possession of
the state. 7 9 Rather it is within the possession of the manufacturer.80 Minnesota
and New Jersey differ from other states in their approach to this issue.
A.

Minnesota

On April 30, 2009, the Minnesota Supreme Court decided the issue of the
discoverability of the source code. Prior to that, multiple Minnesota lower courts
had ruled drivers were not entitled to the source code. 8 ' However, the Minnesota
Supreme Court found otherwise.
74 Chun, 943 A.2d at 130, 140. Truncating simply means the third decimal place is dropped
without rounding. For instance a .079 reading would be reported as a .07. Id.
75 !d.
76 Id. at 138.
77 Donaldson v. State, 561 So.2d 648 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
78 State v. Waldrum, No. M1999-01924-CCA-R3-CD, 2000 WL 1801861 (Tenn, Crim. App.
Dec. 8, 2000).
79 See Fargo, 747 N.W.2d at 134 (holding source code is not discoverable because there was no
proof the State had possession, custody or control of it.); Robinson, 860 N.Y.S.2d at 167 (finding the
People were not required to make the source code available because the People never possessed it.)
and Hills, 663 S.E.2d at 266 (defendant not entitled to source code because the State did not possess
or control it).
80 See e.g., Levine, 747 N.W.2d 130; Bernini, 207 P.3d 789; Kuhl, 755 N.W.2d 389; Walters,
2006 WL 785393; Hills, 663 S.E.2d 265; Robinson, 860 N.Y.S.2d 159.
81 See Abbott v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 760 N.W.2d 920 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009); State v.
Kuklok, No. A08-1493, 2009 WL 818923 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2009); Swendra v. Comm'r of Pub.
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In State v. Underdahl, two different defendants sought production of the
source code in their respective DUI prosecutions. 82 The State District Court had
ordered the State to produce the source codes in both instances.8 3 If the State
failed to produce the source code within thirty (30) days, the District Court would
dismiss charges and find the breath test results inadmissible. 84 However, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the orders finding the defendants had failed to
show the source code was relevant to their guilt or innocence.8 5 The Minnesota
Supreme Court agreed to hear the consolidated cases.
Procedurally, the two defendants were in slightly different postures. On February 8, 2006, Dale Underdahl was stopped for suspicion of DUI.86 Underdahl performed poorly on field sobriety exercises and was subsequently arrested for
DUI. 87 Underdahl submitted to the implied consent statute and provided a
breath test sample. 8 The breath test was performed on the Intoxilyzer 5000EN. s9
The results were over the legal limit and Underdahl was formally charged with
DUI. 90 Underdahl filed a motion for discovery requesting the source code for the
Intoxilyzer 5000 EN. 9 1 Underdahl argued that challenging the validity of the
92
breath results was the only way for him to dispute the charges against him.
Further, he argued that in order for him to challenge the validity of the Intoxilyzer 5000EN results he needed the source code.9 3 However, Underdahl failed
94
to introduce any memoranda or exhibits in support of his argument.
On July 28, 2007, Timothy Brunner was stopped on suspicion of DUI.9 5 He
also submitted to the implied consent statute and provided a breath sample.96
The breath test was performed on an Intoxilyzer 5000 EN.9 7 The results were
over the legal limit and Brunner was formally charged with DUI.98 Brunner filed
Safety, No. A07-2434, 2009 WL 66070 (Minn. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2009); O'Fallon v. Comm'r of Pub.
Safety, No. A07-1545, 2008 WL 3835728 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2008); State v. Olcott, No. A062340, 2008 WL 1747675 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2008).
82 The two defendants were Dale Lee Underdahl and Timothy Arlen Brunner. Underdahl,767
N.W.2d at 679.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 id. at 680.
87 Underdahl,767 N.W.2d at 680.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d at 680.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 685.
95 Id.at 680.
96 Id.
97 Underdahl, 767 N.W.2d at 680.
98 Id.
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a motion for discovery of the source code of the Intoxilyzer 5000EN. 99 In support, Brunner submitted a memorandum of law and nine (9) exhibits.' ° The exhibits were as follows:
[T]he first exhibit was the written testimony of David Wagner, a computer
science professor at the University of California in Berkeley, which explained the source code in voting machines, the source code's importance in
finding defects and problems in those machines, and the issues surrounding
the source code's disclosure. The next exhibits detailed Brunner's attempts
to obtain the source code, both from the State and CMI. The last exhibit
was a copy of a report prepared on behalf of the Defendants in New Jersey
litigation about the reliability of New Jersey's breath-test machine. 10 1
The Court's decision as to both defendants turned on the requirements of
Minn. R. Crim. P. 9.01. The rule governs discovery in criminal cases.' 2 The Rule
first delineates what discovery the prosecution must disclose without a court order.' 3 Second, the rule outlines under which circumstances a court may use its
discretion to order additional discovery.' 0 4 Due to the language of the rule, there
is no argument the source code is discoverable without a court order. Therefore,
the pertinent part of the rule is as follows,
[u]pon motion of the defendant, the trial court any time before trial, may in
its discretion, require the prosecuting attorney to disclose to defense counsel and to permit the inspection, reproduction or testing of any relevant
material and information not subject to disclosure without order of court
under Rule 9.01, subd. 1, provided, however a showing is made that the
information may relate to the guilt or innocence of the defendant or negate
105
guilt or reduce the culpability of the defendant as to the offense charged.
The Minnesota Supreme Court then framed the issue as whether the source code
is relevant under the rule, and if so, whether or not the defendants made a showing that the source code related to their guilt or innocence.10 6
The Court acknowledged it had not previously reached the issue of what type
of showing is required to prove that information relates to a defendant's guilt or
innocence. 107 Because it had not addressed the issue previously, the Court drew
an analogy to circumstances wherein a defendant wishes to review confidential
99 Id. at 685.
100 Id.
101 Id. (citations omitted.)
102 Underdahl,767 N.W.2d at 684.
103 Id.
104 Id.
105 MiNN. R. CRIM. P. 9.01, subdiv. 2(3).
106 Underdahl,767 N.W.2d at 684.
107 Id.
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information as a part of his defense. In those cases, the Court enumerated a standard wherein the defendant must show, "some plausible showing that the infor08
The
mation sought would be both material and favorable to the defense."'
10 9
code.
source
the
of
issue
the
to
standard
this
Court then extended
In applying this standard, the Court compared and contrasted the motions of
Underdahl and Brunner. The Court found that in requesting the source code,
Underdahl did not support the motion with any additional information.""0 Conversely, as stated, supra, Brunner provided substantial support for his motion in
the form of a memorandum of law and multiple exhibits. As a result the Court
ruled that, "Underdahl made no threshold evidentiary showing whatsoever; while
he argued that challenging the validity of the Intoxilyzer was the only way for him
to dispute the charges against him, he failed to demonstrate how the source code
would help him do so.' 1" However, in regards to Brunner, the Court found that,
"Brunner's submissions show that an analysis of the source code may reveal deficiencies that could challenge the reliability2 of the Intoxilyzer and, in turn, would
'
relate to Brunner's guilt or innocence.""
Once determining the source code was relevant and related to Brunner's guilt
or innocence, the Court faced the final question of whether the source code was
within the possession of the prosecution. In finding the source code was within
the possession of the State, the Court relied upon the "request for proposal"
issued by the State when it replaced the previous breath test machine with the
Intoxilyzer 5000EN. 13a The request for proposal stated that any copyrightable
material would be the contracted property of the State." 4 Therefore, the Court
concluded the State owned some of the source code because of the copyright
language in the request for proposal.' 1 5 As a result, the Court held Brunner was
entitled to the source code, while Underdahl was not.
Since the Minnesota Supreme Court's ruling in Underdahl,multiple Minnesota
lower courts have found the State is required to produce the source code to defendants or face results adverse to the prosecution." 6 However, to date, CMI and
108

Id. (Citations omitted.)
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Id.
Id. at 685.
Underdahl,767 N.W.2d at 685.
Id.
Id. at 686.

114

Id.

115 Id. at 687.
116 See State v. Crane, 766 N.W.2d 68 (Minn. Ct. App. 2009); Lund v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety,
No. A08-1408, 2009 WL 1587135 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 26, 2009); Ersfeld v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety,
No. A08-1856, 2009 WL 2595947 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2009); Thompson v. Comm'r of Pub.
Safety, No. A08-1240, 2009 WL 1444133 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 2009); State v. Kish, No. A08-1342,
2009 WL 2432284 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug 11, 2009); Duncan v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, No. A08-2237,
2009 WL 2366280 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 4,2009); Freeman v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, No. A08-1433,
2009 WL 1919931 (Minn. Ct. App. Jul. 7, 2009); State v. Veldhuizen, Nos. A08-2110, A08-2112, A08-
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the State of Minnesota are still locked in litigation as to the production of the
source code.' 17 Consequently, the source code has not yet been reviewed by an
independent party as to how it impacts on the reliability of the Intoxilyzer 5000
EN.
B.

New Jersey

In New Jersey, the State Supreme Court undertook its own review of the reliability of the breath testing machines used in the state. In State v. Chun1 18 the
Defendants were twenty (20) individuals arrested throughout New Jersey for
DUI.119 Each of the Defendants had challenged the admissibility of the breath
test results in their particular cases. 120 Prior to its examination of the current
breath testing machine, the Court briefly related the legal history of breath testing within the State.
The Court found that the reliability of breath testing machines had not been at
issue for decades in New Jersey. 121 The Court had long ago ruled that breath
testing machines were scientifically reliable and accurate instruments for determining the blood alcohol concentration of drivers.1 22 The results were deemed so
reliable that anyone driving with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal
limit was per se guilty of DUI. 23 The Court recognized that in the years between
their finding of reliability and the case at bar, the breath test machines had fallen
into ill repair. 124 As a result, New Jersey's Office of the Attorney General selected a new breath testing machine called the Alcotest 7110 MKIII-C
("Alcotest").125
In Chun, the Court examined the reliability of the Alcotest. 1 26 In order to do
so, the Court appointed a Special Master to conduct hearings regarding the reliability of the machine.' 27 The hearings spanned four (4) months and included testimony from eleven (11) witnesses called by the State and two (2) from the
defense. 28 The Special Master ordered the State to provide the source code for
the Alcotest and several Alcotest machines to the defense for their analysis in
2113, 2009 WL 1684494 (Minn. Ct. App. Jun. 16, 2009); Bowen v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, No. A081267, 2009 WL 1312130 (Minn. Ct. App. May 12, 2009).
117 Crane, 766 N.W.2d at 72.
118 State v. Chun, 943 A.2d 114 (N.J. 2008).
119 Chun, 943 A.2d at 121.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 120.
123 Id.
124 Chun, 943 A.2d at 120.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 121.
128 Id. at 132.
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preparation for the hearings. 12 9 Draeger, the manufacturer of the Alcotest, refused to disclose the source code because it considered the code proprietary
information.13 °
The Supreme Court intervened and issued an order requiring Draeger to provide the source code for analysis by an independent software house agreed upon
by both Draeger and the defense. 131 However, the defense and Draeger could
not agree on a software house. 132 The Court again intervened and ordered each
party to hire an independent software house to review the source code at its own
expense. 33 The software houses came to different conclusions regarding the reliability of the machine which necessitated further hearings.1 34 After the hearings,
the Special Master concluded the Alcotest was generally scientifically reliable
with the caveat that certain changes be made to account for potential errors in
breath test results. 135 The New Jersey Supreme Court reviewed the findings of
the Special Master at length and adopted some, though not all, of his
recommendations. 136
In determining whether to adopt the specific recommendations of the Special
Master, the Court related the standard of admissibility for scientific evidence. As
articulated by the Court, the standard is as follows:
[a]dmissibility of scientific tests results in a criminal trial is permitted only
when those tests are shown to be generally accepted, within the relevant
scientific community, to be reliable. That is to say, the test must have a
"sufficient scientific basis to produce uniform and reasonably reliable re137
sults and will contribute materially to the ascertainment of the truth.'
Further,
[p]roof of general acceptance does not mean that there must be complete
agreement in the scientific community about the techniques, methodology,
or procedures that underlie the scientific evidence. Even the "possibility of
error" does not mean that a particular scientific device falls short of the
required showing of general acceptance. 13 8
129
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Id. at 144.
Id. at 136 (citations omitted).
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1. Findings of the Special Master
It is not necessary to discuss every finding and recommendation of the Special
Master for the purposes of this Article. Instead, a few findings, and the subsequent analysis by the Supreme Court, show two things pertinent to this Article.
First, the review of the Alcotest and its source code revealed potential errors in
blood alcohol results. Second, in some circumstances where there were potential
errors, the New Jersey Supreme Court determined the risk to a particular defendant was outweighed by the benefit of streamlining DUI prosecution as a whole.
It is the findings by the Special Master which raise these issues which will be
focused on below.
Utilizing the above standard regarding scientific evidence, the Court reviewed
the findings of the Special Master. The Alcotest uses breath test results to extrapolate the blood alcohol content of a driver.1 39 The Alcotest uses a mathematical
calculation based on a blood/breath ratio to convert the breath result to a blood
result. 4 ° The Special Master recommended that the Alcotest was reliable in regards to the ratio, and the ensuing
blood alcohol results. The Court accepted this
41
finding by the Special Master.'
A breath sample must meet certain criteria to be valid. According to these
criteria, the sample must be a minimum volume of 1.5 liters.1 4 2 The Special
Master found evidence that women over sixty (60) years of age are not capable of
providing the required sample of 1.5 liters.1 43 As a result, the Special Master
recommended lowering the minimum volume to 1.2 liters for women over sixty
(60).144 Based on the scientific evidence, the Supreme Court adopted the lowering of the minimum volume to 1.2 liters for women over sixty (60). 145 The Court
found the minimum volume issue mostly related to cases where woman over sixty
(60) were charged with a refusal to provide a breath sample despite the fact it
may have been they were physically incapable of providing the sample. 146 Therefore, the Court found absent some other evidence which indicated a defendant
woman over sixty (60) was capable of providing the sample, a readout generated
by the machine which indicated an insufficient breath volume could not be used
147
against the defendant to prove a refusal charge.
139 As noted in the Part II, the New Jersey statute relies upon the alcohol content of a driver's
blood, as opposed to breath, in DUI prosecution. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:4-50 (West 2009).
140 The blood breath ratio utilized by the Alcotest is twenty-one hundred (2100) to one (1).
Chun, 943 A.2d at 138.
141 Id. at 139.
142 Id.
143 Idat 140.
144 Id.
145 Chun, 943 A.2d at 144.
146 Id.
147 Id.
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The Special Master recommended the acceptable tolerance range between results be changed to 0.005 percent blood alcohol content or plus or minus five (5)
percent of the mean of the four readings, whichever is greater. 1 48 According to
the Court, precision and accuracy can be ensured by a narrow range, while the
149
wider the range the more question there is as to the reliability of the results.
Therefore, as noted by the Court, the acceptable range is of the utmost importance when an acceptable reading above the legal limit makes a defendant per se
guilty of the offense.' 50 Prior to Chun, the acceptable tolerance range was 0.01
alcohol content or plus or minus ten (10) percent whichever is
percent 15blood
1
greater.
In analyzing the Special Master's recommendation to lower the acceptable
range, the Court pointed out it had specifically endorsed the tolerance range of
0.01 percent blood alcohol content. 1 52 However the addition of the "or plus or
minus ten (10) percent whichever is greater", was effectively a mistaken interpretation of the Supreme Court's ruling by a lower court.' 5 3 The result of the mistake was to double the tolerance range allowed. 54 The Court even acknowledged
that interpretation of its ruling doubling the range was in response to complaints
1 55
about the machine having too many readings which were not in tolerance.
Meaning the machines were programmed in such a manner as to allow for wider
range between acceptable readings, but at the expense of the accuracy of the
results.
Consequently, in Chun, the Court directed that the machine be programmed
to have an acceptable tolerance range of plus or minus 0.005 percent blood alcohol content from the mean or plus or minus five (5) percent of the mean, whichever is greater.' 56 For those cases pending wherein the machine may have
deemed results acceptable that were outside of the range, the Court created a
formula to ascertain whether the results were in fact out of tolerance. 57 If, according to the formula, the results were out of tolerance they are not admissible
58
in court.'
The Alcotest uses fuel cells to pass an electrical current through a sample of
breath. 5 9 The electrical charge reacts with the alcohol. 6 ° The reaction of the
148
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fuel cell can be represented graphically as a curve and the percentage ot alcohol
is measured by calculating the area under the curve.' 61 As fuel cells age, the
shape of the curve changes, although the area under the curve is unchanged. 16 2
This phenomenon is called fuel cell drift. 1 63 Because of the change in the curve, a
portion of the area that is the basis for the alcohol measurement is not captured
by the machine.' The result is lower than accurate readings. 16 5 However, unbeknownst to anyone prior to Chun, the manufacturer had installed a compensating
algorithm into the source code.' 6 6 If fuel cell drift was detected by the machine
during a control test, the machine mathematically increased the final result according to the algorithm. 1 67 The Court found that in the future fuel cell drift
could be controlled by more regular replacement of the fuel cells as opposed to
the algorithm.' 68 However, as to those cases where the algorithm had adjusted
the results, the Court ruled there was not sufficient evidence to cast doubt on the
69
reliability of the results, and they would therefore be admissible.1
During the analysis of the source code, the manufacturer's own expert identified a significant flaw in the source code which can lead to an inaccurate blood
alcohol result. 170 The error comes into play when a subject provides two samples
that are outside the acceptable tolerance range. 17 The machine then requests a
third sample. The three breath samples create six (6) results.1 72 However, the
machine is programmed to retain only four (4) results at a time.' 7 3 The machine
compensates by retaining the first and last two readings, but drops the middle two
readings.' 74 If the middle two readings are the lowest readings, the mean result
will not include the lowest readings thereby erroneously raising the blood alcohol
results. 7 5
Consequently, New Jersey's highest court ordered that the error be fixed.1 76
However, it did not reject all results that implicated the error. Instead it em160 Chun, 943 A.2d at 154.
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Chun, 943 A.2d at 154.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 154.
168 Id. at 155.
169 Id. at 156.
170 Chun, 943 A.2d at 157.
171 Id.
172 There are three results using infrared spectrometry and three results using electrochemical
cell technology. See id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Chun, 943 A.2d at 157.
176 Id. at 172.
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ployed a formula developed by the manufacturer, which purports to rectify the
error.' 77 Once the formula is applied to the six (6) results reported on the electronic printout from the machine, the results from the formula are admissible in a
DUI prosecution. 17 8
The original source code of the Alcotest had a "catastrophic error detection
device., 17 9 With the device, if the machine encountered a catastrophic error, the
machine would shut down.'
However, the source code was subsequently
programmed to disable the device. 18' The Special Master recommended, and the
1 82
Supreme Court agreed, that the device should be re-enabled immediately.
However, the Court found there was no evidence the lack of the device had an
adverse effect on particular blood alcohol results. 183 Therefore, the admissibility
of blood alcohol results was not affected in any way by the finding.
V.

APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

A.

Presumption of Innocence

As discussed in the Rights section, the presumption of innocence has been a
building block of jurisprudence since common law. The eighteenth century English legal scholar, William Blackstone' 84 coined what has been called "Blackstone's Ratio": the concept that, "it is better that ten guilty persons escape than
that one innocent suffer."' 85 This "ratio" has been all but lost in modern DUI
laws and prosecution. It has been supplanted by a notion that aggressive prosecution is more important than preserving the presumption of innocence so that the
innocent do not suffer.
As noted previously, Minnesota and New Jersey represent the ends of the current continuum of DUI prosecution, with Minnesota at the relatively lenient end
and New Jersey at the stricter end. However, there can be no doubt DUI law as a
whole is trending towards New Jersey.' 8 6 According to Minnesota's statute, evidence that the results of the breath test were 0.04 or more is "relevant evidence"
177 Id. at 158.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 159.
180 Chun, 943 A.2d at 159.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 The Blackstone Institute, http://www.blackstoneinstitute,.org/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
185 Think Exist, http://thinkexist.comquotes/wilfiam-blackstone/ (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
186 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1005 (2009) (wherein a breath alcohol of 0.08 or more is prima facie
evidence of guilt); FLA. STAT. § 316.193 (2009) (wherein a breath alcohol level of 0.08 or higher establishes a rebuttable presumption of guilt); and WASH. REv. CODE § 46.61.502 (2009) (wherein a person
is guilty of DUI with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or higher within two hours after driving as
shown by an accurate and reliable analysis of the person's blood).
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in indicating whether or not a person was under the influence of alcohol.' 87 Although the results are relevant, they do not in and of themselves require guilt.
Not so in New Jersey.
1 88
That
In 1964, in New Jersey, the legal limit was 0.15 blood alcohol content.
statute further stated a blood alcohol result of 0.15 or over constituted a "presumption" the defendant was under the influence of alcohol. 89 However, the
presumption was not conclusive and the defendant was able to produce rebuttal
evidence to show he was not in fact impaired by alcohol despite the results of the
blood alcohol test.' 90 In 1964, the Supreme Court of New Jersey actually held,
"[t]he presumption is not conclusive since contradicting evidence is expressly permitted and the statute does not make it an offense simply to operate a motor
vehicle when a chemical test shows 0.15 percent or more of alcohol in the blood
19
of the driver." 1
Clearly a "presumption of guilt" based on a test result neutralizes the "presumption of innocence" believed to be a well-settled part of American jurisprudence. But at the very least it allows a defendant to present evidence in his own
defense to counteract the presumption. As the law has evolved in New Jersey,
even that concession is no longer available to defendants.
In 1987, the Supreme Court of New Jersey revisited the issue of whether or not
the presumption of guilt associated with a blood alcohol result over the legal limit
was rebuttable and found that it was not, in State v. Tischio.192 In Tischio, the
specific question before the Court was whether a defendant could present evidence showing that despite his blood alcohol level being over the limit at the time
of the breath test, it was not over the limit at the time he was driving. 193 This socalled "extrapolation evidence" is based on the theory that in the time it takes to
get a driver from the location of the arrest to the location of the breath test his
blood alcohol content is continuing to rise.
The Supreme Court held that a defendant may be convicted of DUI when his
blood alcohol level is over the legal limit at the time of the test, regardless of
what his blood alcohol level was at the time of the offense.19 4 In so ruling, the
Court went even further by forbidding defendants from presenting any evidence
attacking the reliability or accuracy of the blood alcohol results. The Court found
187
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1 95
that any such evidence had no probative value and was therefore inadmissible.
The Court defended its ruling by noting,

[tihe overall scheme of these laws reflects the dominant legislative purpose
to eliminate intoxicated drivers from the roadways of this State. To this
end, the Legislature, working in tandem with the courts, has consistently
sought to streamline the implementation of these laws and to remove the
obstacles impeding the efficient and successful prosecution of those who
196
drink and drive.
What the legislature did, in tandem with the courts, is eliminate completely the
presumption of innocence from DUI cases.
There was a single dissenting voice in Tischio. Justice Clifford wrote a scathing
dissent wherein he pled with the majority to return to a view where drivers could
defend themselves from a DUI charge by presenting evidence to rebut the presumption of guilt. Justice Clifford opined that a blood alcohol result over the
legal limit should be prima facie evidence of guilt, as opposed to conclusive proof
of guilt. 1 97 Justice Clifford commented on what should be obvious when he
stated,
[s]urely a defendant should be allowed to show, through expert proof extrapolating the breathalyzer results back to the time of operation, that the
State's prima facie case has been overcome, and that in fact the proofs are
insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable doubt an excessive reading at
198
the time the vehicle was being driven.
In truth, the defendant cannot present evidence challenging the results of a blood
alcohol test, thereby eliminating even the illusion of the presumption of innocence in these types of prosecutions.
In New Jersey, the courts do not even make a pretense of protecting the rights
of the innocent at the expense of the possibility of a guilty person going free. In
other words, the New Jersey legal system has completely eschewed Blackstone's
Ratio. This reality is evidenced by Supreme Court decisions in the State.
As previously noted, the Alcotest uses a blood/breath ratio of twenty-one hundred (2100) to one (1) to calculate the blood alcohol content in a Defendant's
blood. 199 In Chun, the New Jersey Supreme Court found this ratio was reliable
despite acknowledging, "[t]here is some evidence that there is a percentage of the
population for whom the 2100 to 1 blood/breath ratio may actually overstate the
presence of blood alcohol...,,2 o The Court justified its finding by alleging, "[t]he
195 Id. at 395.
196 Id. at 393.
197 Tischio, 527 A.2d at 399 (Clifford, J., dissenting).
198 Id.
199 Chun, 943 A.2d at 138.
200 Id. at 139.
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percentage of individuals for whom there may be an overestimation by use of this
ratio remains 'extraordinarily small.'" 20 1 A simple question illustrates the danger
of the decision. What if you were one of the individuals in this "extraordinarily
small" group?
Chun was not the first time the New Jersey Supreme Court had reviewed the
issue of the blood/breath ratio. In State v. Downie, the Court also ruled the ratio
was reliable.2 °2 Similar to Chun, the Court did not concern itself with innocent
individuals who may be caught in the inaccuracy of the ratio. During the case,
one of the State experts estimated that only three persons in a thousand might be
convicted as a result of an erroneous reading. 20 3 The Court also admitted that
erroneous results due to the ratio could wrongfully convict 2.3 percent of suspected DUI Defendants. 2 4 Despite this knowledge, the Court found the ratio
reliable when it held, "[w]e are confident that continued use of the breathalyzer
will not lead to unjust convictions... The legislature wanted drunk drivers off the
road. As a measure for determining a motor vehicle violation, a scientific test that
produces predictably accurate results in 97.7% of the cases is not unreasonable."20 5 Blackstone would not have shared the Court's confidence or assessment
as to what is reasonable under common law and American jurisprudence.
B.

Right of Confrontation

It is not difficult to see that allowing a breath test result over the legal limit to
establish per se guilt against a defendant causes fatal harm to a defendant's right
to confront the evidence against him. Even allowing a result over the legal limit
to stand as prima facie evidence, or presumptive proof of the crime, damages the
right. As discussed at length in Section I.B., the spirit behind the right of confrontation is to ensure no one is convicted by evidence, which he has not had the
ability to cross-examine. However, that is exactly what is happening in current
DUI prosecutions.
As the right to confrontation stands now, testimonial statements by a witness
not called at trial are only admissible if the witness is unavailable for trial, and the
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the evidence.20 6 In order to
prove a DUI based on an unlawful breath test result, prosecutors rely on the
computer results generated by the breath test machine in a particular case. These
results are produced by the machine in the form of a computer printout, which
also identifies the breath test operator who administered the test. If the State
shows the breath test machine has been properly maintained and is in good work201
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ing order, the printout is entered into evidence and the results are proof of the
crime of DUI.
There can be no question the printout is testimonial. As the Florida Supreme
Court noted, "[a] breath test affidavit is created under circumstances where the
technician is expecting it will be used at a later trial. More precisely, the sole
purpose of a breath test affidavit is to authenticate the results of the test for use
at trial. ' 20 7 Despite this seemingly obvious conclusion, the New Jersey Supreme
Court disagreed when it held,
[t]he essential elements of testimonial evidence are a report of a past event,
given in response to police interrogation, with the purpose of establishing
evidence that a Defendant committed an offense. Judged against this standard, the AIR 20 8 falls outside the definition of testimonial on two, and arguably all three, grounds. First, the AIR reports a present, and not a past,
piece of information or data. Second, although given in the presence of a
police officer who operates the device, nothing that the operator does can
influence the machine's evaluation of the information on its report of the
data. Third, although the officer may have a purpose of establishing evidence of a BAC in excess of the permissible limit, the machine has no such
intent and may as likely generate a result that exonerates the test subject as
convicts him or her. Seen through this prism, we conclude that the AIR is
not testimonial in the sense that was intended by the Framers of the Confrontation Clause.20 9

New Jersey's tortured analysis of the Confrontation Clause leaves doubt as to
whether even the most obvious instances of testimonial evidence would meet its
standard.
The Court says the printout records a present event; however, when it is
presented as evidence in court it is evidence of a past event. Putting that aside,
the analysis still does not hold. For instance, when a police officer interviews a
witness to a crime, he takes a statement. That statement is the person's "present"
thoughts on the past crime being investigated in exactly the same way the blood
alcohol results are the "present" evidence of what the driver's blood alcohol was
when he was driving in the past.
Although the Court suggests there is nothing the breath test operator can do
to influence the results of the test, this presumes he is conducting an honest test.
For instance, he could hold a gun to the defendant's head and force him to drink
alcohol prior to the breath test. Although admittedly extreme, the point is that
207 State v. Belvin, 986 So. 2d 516, 521 (Fla. 2008) ("breath test affidavit" is Florida's nomenclature for what is being called a "computer printout" in this Article).
208 "AIR" is New Jersey's nomenclature for what is being called a "computer printout" in this
Article.
209 Chun, 943 A.2d at 169-70.
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only if one assumes the breath test operator is honestly conducting the test, can it
be said he has no influence. Similarly, in the example of the witness statement, if
one assumes the officer is conducting an honest interview, he cannot influence
the statement. The witness will simply say what he says and the officer will record
it.
Finally, the Court opines the machine may exonerate the Defendant as much
as convict him. If the results of the breath test were below the legal limit, one
presumes there would be no trial and therefore the issue of whether the printout
is testimonial is moot. The same can be said of the hypothetical witness. The
witness may give information about the crime, which could exonerate the accused
as much as convict him. The officer would not know which type of statement it
was until he took it. Therefore, under the New Jersey Supreme Court's analysis,
the hypothetical statement taken by the officer is not testimonial and may be
presented in court without calling the witness. This is a quintessential example of
what the Confrontation Clause prohibits.
Interestingly, despite their completely divergent analysis, Florida and New
Jersey each end up with the result that the government can introduce evidence
against the driver which the driver is not able to confront. These states pay only
lip service to the right to confrontation. In both states, in order for the computer
printout to be admissible, the defendant must be allowed to cross-examine the
breath test operator regarding the printout. 2 10 Taken at face value it seems to
meet the requirements of the right, however, the breath test operator does nothing more than observe the Defendant and respond to the prompts of the machine. 21 ' The operator does not generate the results. Making the breath test
operator available does not comport with the spirit of the Confrontation Clause
as one cannot challenge the results of the test through cross-examination of the
operator.
In order to cross-examine the evidence of the breath test results, the defendant
must be allowed to cross-examine the science and the accuracy of the results. As
discussed at length above, New Jersey has expressly prohibited this type of challenge. Most other states are effectively prohibiting the challenge by refusing to
make the source code available to defendants.21 2 Defendants are left with no
option but to accept that the machine performed properly in their case and the
results are accurate whether that is the truth or not. The consequence is the death
of the right to confront the evidence against a defendant in a DUI case.

210 Id. at 148; Belvin, 986 So. 2d at 521.
211 Chun, 943 A.2d at 165.
212 See Levine, 747 N.W.2d 130; House, 2009 WL 2705919; Robinson, 860 N.Y.S. 2d 861; Hills,
663 S.E.2d 265; Walters, 2006 WL 785393; Kuhl, 755 N.W.2d 389; Bernini, 207 P.3d 789; and Bastos,
985 So. 2d 37.
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C.

Right to a Jury Trial

In Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, the U.S. Supreme Court evaluated the

right to a jury trial in the context of a DUI. As in the past, the Court attempted to
determine whether the crime is petty or serious. In so doing, it further refined the
13
test to make the determination, but stopped just short of creating a bright line."
In Blanton, the accused faced a minimum of two (2) days in jail and a maximum
of six (6) months in jail or forty-eight (48) community service hours while dressed
in such a way as to identify the accused as a DUI offender.2 1 4 Additionally, the
defendant had to pay a fine ranging from two hundred (200) to one thousand
(1000) dollars, surrender his driver's license for a suspension of ninety (90) days,
and take an alcohol education course at his own expense.2 15
In applying the standard enumerated in Baldwin, the Court found the seriousness of the offense to not be determined solely by the maximum possible term of
incarceration, but also the other penalties associated with the offense.216 However, the Court noted that offenses which carried a possible incarceration of six
(6) months or less could be presumed petty. 217 In those cases, an accused would
only be entitled to a jury trial if he could demonstrate the additional penalties
218
were so severe as to show the legislature viewed the offense as a "serious" one.
In applying this refined standard to the case at bar,219the Court found the defendant in Blanton was not entitled to a trial by jury.
There can be no credible argument made that legislatures view a DUI as anything less than serious. As an example, in New Jersey the case law repeatedly
cited in this Article is riddled with declarations of the importance of DUI prosecution. In its legislative findings regarding adding additional sanctions for DUI
offenders, the New Jersey Legislature expressly stated,
[t]his State's penalties for drunk driving, including the mandatory suspension of driver's licenses and counseling for offenders are among the strongest in the nation. However, despite the severity of existing penalties, far too
many persons who have been convicted under the drunk driving law continue to imperil the lives of their fellow citizens by driving while intoxicated
.. . The judicious deployment of ignition interlock devices, as provided
under this act, will enhance and strengthen the State's existing efforts to
keep drunk drivers off the highways. 2 °
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The legislature clearly stated how important it believes DUI enforcement is and,
as demonstrated throughout this article, New Jersey courts regularly use its importance as a justification for continually curbing the rights of the accused. Despite this oft-repeated importance, a DUI defendant in New Jersey does not have
the right to a jury trial. 22 1 Instead, trial is treated as a "quasi-criminal" proceeding and is judged by a magistrate. 222 Again, the rights of the accused are sacri2 23
ficed at the altar of protecting the public from the "scourge of drunk driving."
Even in those States where the accused is entitled to a jury trial, the trial is a
sham. The continued erosion of rights, such as the presumption of innocence and
the right to confrontation, lead to truncated proceedings in front of a jury
wherein the defendant is severely limited in his defense. This is not the right to a
jury trial outlined by the Founding Fathers in the Constitution.
CONCLUSION

States are imposing even more severe sanctions on first time DUI offenders,
while simultaneously restraining the alleged offender's ability to defend himself
from the charge. All of this is done in the name of protecting the general public
against the dangers of drunk driving. Increasingly severe prosecution is not the
answer for two reasons. First, it is a dangerous and slippery slope to exchange
constitutional rights for supposed safety. Second, there is a better way to reach
the desired goal of less drunk drivers on the road.
Benjamin Franklin said, "[t]hey that can give up essential liberty to obtain a
little temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety., 2 24 There is no more
eloquent way to state the danger in trading constitutional rights for alleged
safety. Even if affording fewer rights to those accused of DUI works, it is at too
great a cost.
If overriding constitutional rights is acceptable in DUI cases, then why not
more serious crimes, or all crimes for that matter? The rights DUI defendants are
losing are the fundamental building blocks of the Constitution and American jurisprudence. The presumption of innocence, the right to confront the evidence
presented against the accused, and the right to a trial by jury in criminal matters
are the bedrock of American legal society. Without them, our system ceases to be
what makes it great. Our system was not built on the notion that every criminal
will be found guilty, but rather it is built on the principle that no innocent person
will be found guilty. The current state of DUI prosecutions is setting a dangerous
trend in the opposite direction and it must not be tolerated.
221 See State v. Hamm, 577 A.2d 1259, 1261 (N.J. 1990).
222 Johnson, 199 A.2d at 815.
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224 Bartlett's Quotations Online - Benjamin Franklin, www.bartleby.com/100/245.1.html (last
visited May 3, 2010).
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Even if one is not persuaded by the philosophical dangers in curbing the rights
of the accused, there are concrete reasons to choose a different path. DUI is the
only crime wherein the accused does not know when they are committing it. A
legal activity can suddenly become illegal at an indeterminate point in time. The
point at which a person is over the legal limit cannot be determined without the
benefit of a breath test machine. Through anecdotal experience as both a prosecutor and a criminal defense attorney specializing in DUI defense, few if any
drivers start drinking alcohol intending to drive intoxicated.
Because these drivers do not have the express purpose of committing a crime,
more severe sanctions are not a deterrent. They are not thinking about the consequences of their crime, because they are not thinking they are committing a
crime. Therefore, the increased cost to tax payers of prosecuting DUIs is not
money well spent. Instead, the answer lies in ubiquitous public transportation.
The battle is already lost when a person who intends to drink some amount of
alcohol leaves the house with their car keys. Before they ever have a drink of
alcohol, the risk they will drive while intoxicated has gone up because they intend
to drive after drinking. It is equally true, that people are not going to stop leaving
their homes to drink socially. Therefore, the answer lies in providing easy and
affordable ways for people to do so without driving. A public transportation infrastructure that runs after drinking establishments are closed to all parts of the
city at an affordable rate will solve the problem. If a person leaves their house to
drink without their car and plans from the start to take an alternate method of
transportation, the risk of drunk driving is eliminated. Many college campuses
employ such a system to great benefit. These systems need to be expanded to
cities as a whole. Public transportation, which has benefits aside from just drunk
driving, is a much better use of resources than increasingly expensive and aggressive prosecution. The "scourge of drunk driving" discussed by Justice Clifford can
be better eliminated by proactive solutions than by reactive prosecution.

